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This paper analyzes the existence of recursive equilibria in a class of convex growth models with in-
complete markets. Households have identical CRRA-preferences, production displays constant returns to
scale with respect to physical and human capital, and all markets are competitive. There are aggregate pro-
ductivity shocks that aﬀect the aggregate returns to physical and human capital investment (stock returns
and wages), and there are idiosyncratic shocks to human capital (idiosyncratic depreciation shocks) that
only aﬀect individual human capital returns. For a given history of aggregate shocks, these idiosyncratic
human capital shocks are independently distributed over time and identically distributed across agents. Fi-
nally, households have the opportunity to trade assets in zero net supply with payoﬀs that depend on the
aggregate shock, but markets are incomplete in the sense that there are no assets with payoﬀs depending
on idiosyncratic shocks. It is shown that there exist recursive equilibria that are simple in the sense that
equilibrium prices (returns) only depend on exogenous shocks. Moreover, the allocations associated with
simple recursive equilibria are identical to the equilibrium allocations of an economy in which households
live in autarky and face both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk.
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Recent work on dynamic general equilibrium models with inﬁnitely-lived agents and unin-
surable idiosyncratic risk has provided important insights into the macroeconomic eﬀects of
market incompleteness (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000). One drawback of this incomplete-
markets approach to macroeconomics is that recursive equilibria are in general diﬃcult to
compute even for simple economic environments.1 A second shortcoming is the lack of a gen-
eral existence proof.2 This paper presents a tractable macroeconomic model with incomplete
markets that avoids some of the shortcomings of the previous literature. More speciﬁcally,
this paper shows that for the incomplete-markets model developed here, there are always
recursive equilibria that are simple in the sense that endogenous equilibrium prices (asset re-
turns) only depend on exogenous shocks. This simplicity of equilibrium means that issues of
existence and comparative dynamics can be studied at a level of generality comparable to the
complete-markets literature, and that many quantitative applications are computationally
straightforward.
The model is an incomplete-markets version of the class of convex growth models analyzed
by, among others, Alvarez and Stokey (1998), Caballe and Santos (1993), Jones and Manuelli
(1990), and Rebelo (1991).3 More speciﬁcally, households have identical CRRA-preferences,
production displays constant returns to scale with respect to reproducible input factors, and
all markets are competitive. For the sake of concreteness, this paper considers the case of two
1For applied work relying on computational methods, see, for example, Aiyagari (1994), denHaan (1997),
Heaton and Lucas (1996), Huggett (1993), and Krusell and Smith (1998).
2Duﬃe, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan (1994) show the existence of stationary recursive
(Markov) equilibria for exchange economies, but they rule out short-sales (borrowing) by assumption and use
a state space that includes endogenous variables in addition to the wealth distribution. Becker and Zilcha
(1997) and Reﬀett, Mirman, and Morand (2002) prove the existence of recursive equilibria for neoclassical
production economies with no assets except physical capital (no bonds).
3Lucas (1988) considers a human capital model with externalities.
1input factors, namely physical and human capital. There are aggregate productivity shocks
that aﬀect aggregate returns to physical and human capital investment (stock returns and
wages), and there are idiosyncratic human capital shocks (depreciations shocks) that only
aﬀect individual human capital returns. Conditional on the history of aggregate shocks, these
idiosyncratic human capital shocks are independently distributed over time and identically
distributed across households. Finally, the ﬁnancial market structure is incomplete in the
sense that there are no assets with payoﬀs that depend on idiosyncratic shocks. However,
households have the opportunity to trade stocks (accumulate physical capital) and any asset
in zero net supply with payoﬀs that depend on the aggregate shock variable (bonds). In
particular, all households can borrow and lend at the common risk-free rate. Moreover,
households’ ability to trade existing assets is only limited by their ability to repay their debt
in the future. In short, the only market imperfection is the lack of explicit insurance markets
for idiosyncratic human capital risk.4
This paper shows that there exist simple recursive equilibria in which endogenous asset
returns (prices) only depend on the exogenous aggregate state. In particular, neither the en-
dogenous wealth distribution nor idiosyncratic shocks aﬀect equilibrium returns. Moreover,
the allocations associated with simple recursive equilibria are identical to the equilibrium
allocations of an economy in which households live in autarky and face both aggregate and
idiosyncratic risk. That is, the equilibrium allocations can be found by solving a one-agent
decision problem. Thus, the incomplete-markets model analyzed in this paper is as tractable
as its complete-markets counterpart. However, whereas idiosyncratic risk does not aﬀect the
equilibrium allocation when markets are complete, it does aﬀect the equilibrium allocation
in the incomplete-markets model. Consequently, the two models may lead to very diﬀerent
4More formally, this paper proves the existence of sequential equilibria with a recursive structure in which
borrowing (debt) constraints never bind (Hernandez and Santos, 1996, Levine and Zame 1996, and Magill
and Quinzii, 1994).
2policy conclusions. For example, whereas social insurance of idiosyncratic risk has no eﬀect
on growth and welfare in the complete-markets economy, it has a substantial eﬀect in the
incomplete-markets economy (Krebs, 2001). Moreover, the welfare cost of business cycles are
likely to be much larger when markets for idiosyncratic risk are incomplete (Krebs, 2002a).
Two properties of the model are essential in deriving the characterization and existence
result. First, in equilibrium the ratio of physical to human capital (capital-to-labor ratio) is
identical across households regardless of their current wealth or current idiosyncratic shock
realization, which implies the existence of a reduced-form production function that is linear.
Second, households choose not to trade the assets in zero-net-supply. This no-trade result
extends the work by Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996) to production economies. In accor-
dance with Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996), the current paper emphasizes the importance
of permanent income shocks in the sense that income follows (approximately) a logarithmic
random walk. Thus, neither borrowing and lending nor self-insurance is an optimal response
to idiosyncratic income shocks. However, in contrast to Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996),
this paper derives the random walk property of income as an endogenous outcome.5
In addition to the work by Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996), there are further examples of
tractable models with incomplete-markets and inﬁnitely-lived agents in the literature. Magill
and Quinzii (2000) consider a model with quadratic preferences (certainty-equivalence) and
Angeletos and Calvet (2001) and Davis and Willen (2001) assume exponential utility and
normally distributed shocks. In contrast, the current paper assumes homothetic preferences,
which is the standard assumption in the growth and business cycle literature. In this sense,
the model presented here seems better suited for macroeconomic analysis. Finally, there is
the work by Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) and Woodford (1986) who consider models with
two inﬁnitely-lived agents that are isomorphic to two-period OLG-models because individual
5The random walk property implies that equilibrium consumption is always unbounded, which is why
the non-existence argument of Krebs (2002b) does not apply.
3endowments ﬂuctuate deterministically. In contrast to this work, the current model allows
for a wide range of distributions of idiosyncratic shocks, a feature that is essential when




Time is indexed by t =0 ,1,... and individual households by i =1 ,...,I.Ac o m p l e t ed e -
scription of the exogenous state of the economy in period t is a vector (s1t,...,s It,S t), where
we interpret sit as a household-speciﬁc (idiosyncratic) shock and St as an economy-wide (ag-
gregate) shock. We assume that sit is an element of a time- and household-independent set
s,a n dt h a tSt is an element of a time-invariant set S. To avoid mathematical technicalities,
the formal proofs also assume that the two sets s and S are ﬁnite. We denote the vector of
idiosyncratic shocks by st =( s1t,...,s It). A (partial) history of idiosyncratic, respectively
aggregate, shocks is denoted by st =( s0,...,s t), respectively St =( S0,...,S t). Clearly, the
ordered set of all histories deﬁnes an event tree with date-events (nodes) (st,St).
The process of exogenous shocks, {st,S t}, is a Markov process with stationary tran-
sition probabilities denoted by π(st+1,S t+1|st,S t)o rπ(s ,S |s,S). We make two assump-
tions on these transition probabilities. First, idiosyncratic shocks have no predictive power:
π(st+1,S t+1|st,S t)=π(st+1,S t+1|St). Second, households are ex-ante identical in the sense
that π(...,s i,t+1,...,s i ,t+1,...,S t+1|St)=π(...,s i ,t+1,...,s i,t+1,...,S t+1|St). For simplic-
ity, we also assume π(s ,S |s,S) > 0 for all (s,S) ∈ s × S. The transition probabilities in
6There is also a literature that rules out trading in any ﬁnancial asset by assumption (for example,
Obstfeld, 1994, and Benabou, 2002). In contrast, in this paper households have the opportunity to trade
assets with aggregate payoﬀs, even though in equilibrium households optimally choose not to take advantage
of this opportunity.
4conjunction with the initial distribution deﬁne in the canonical way the node-probabilities
π(st,St) and the conditional node-probabilities π(st+n,St+n|st,St). Notice that our assump-
tions imply that conditional on the history of aggregate shocks, idiosyncratic shocks are
independently distributed over time and identically distributed across agents. That is, con-
ditional on St+1, the distribution of si,t+1 is independent of st
i (or st for that matter) and
the same for all i. Note also that our formulation allows for the possibility that sit and sjt
are correlated.
Assumption 1. The exogenous shock process, {st,S t}, is a Markov chain with transition
probabilities satisfying π(...,s i,t+1,...,s i ,t+1,...,S t+1|St)=π(...,s i ,t+1,...,s i,t+1,...,S t+1|St)
and π(st+1,S t+1|st,S t)=π(st+1,S t+1|St).
Economic variables at time t are often deﬁned by functions xt :( s)t+1 × (S)t+1 →
IR
n ,x t = xt(st,St). Any function xt deﬁnes a random variable in the canonical way. For this
random variable, we denote the unconditional expectation by E[xt]=
 
st,St π(st,St)xt(st,St)
and the conditional expectation by E[xt+n|st,St]=
 
st,St π(st+n,St+n|st,St)xt+n(st+n,St+n).
There is one ﬁrm that produces an “all-purpose” good which can be used for con-
sumption, investment in physical capital, and investment in human capital. If the ﬁrm
employs Kt units of physical capital and Ht units of human capital in period t,t h e ni t
produces Yt = AtF(Kt,H t) units of the good in period t. Here F is a standard neoclas-
sical production function. More speciﬁcally, we assume that F displays constant-returns-
to-scale, is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and sat-
isﬁes F(0,H)=F(K,0) = 0 as well as limK→0 Fk(K,H) = limH→0 Fh(K,H)=+ ∞
and limK→∞ Fk(K,H) = limH→∞ Fh(K,H) = 0 . Total factor productivity is a function
A : S → IR ++ that assigns to each aggregate state St a (strictly positive) productivity level
At = A(St).
5Assumption 2. Output is produced according to Yt = AtF(Kt,H t), where F is a stan-
dard neoclassical production function (in particular, it displays constant-returns-to-scale)
and At = A(St).
The ﬁrm rents input factors (physical and human capital) in competitive markets. We
denote the rental rate of physical capital by ˜ rkt and the rental rate of human capital (the
wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor) by ˜ rht. In each period, the ﬁrm hires capital and labor
up to the point where current proﬁt is maximized. Thus, the ﬁrm solves the following static
maximization problem:
maxKt,Ht {AtF(Kt,H t) − ˜ rktKt − ˜ rhtHt } . (1)
Let kit and hit stand for the stock of physical and human capital owned by household i at
the beginning of period t, and denote the corresponding investment levels by xkit and xhit.
If we denote household i s consumption by cit, then the sequential budget constraint reads:
cit + xkit + xhit =˜ rktkit +˜ rhthit (2)
ki,t+1 =( 1 − δkt)kit + xkit ,k it ≥ 0
hi,t+1 =( 1 − δht + ηit)hit + xhit ,h it ≥ 0
ki0 + hi0 given .
In (2) δkt and δht denote the average depreciation rate of human and physical capital,
respectively. These average depreciation rates are deﬁned by functions δk : S → IR + and
δh : S → IR + assigning to each aggregate shock St  S a deprecation rate δkt = δk(St), respec-
tively δht = δh(St). The term ηit denotes a household-speciﬁc shock to the stock of human
capital and is deﬁned by a function η : s×S → I R assigning to each (s,S) s×S a realization
6ηit = η(sit,S t). Notice that we allow for the possibility that ηit > 0.7 Since ˜ rhtηit is labor
income of household i, the random variable ηit determines the nature of idiosyncratic labor
income risk.
Assumption 3. The depreciation shocks are deﬁned by δkt = δk(St), δht = δh(St), and
ηit = η(sit,S t).
Some remarks on the formulation of the budget constraint (2) are in order.
Remark 1. The model does not distinguish between general and speciﬁc human capital.
Similarly, the idiosyncratic shocks to human capital, ηit, could be either shocks to general
or shocks to speciﬁc human capital. A negative human capital shock, ηit < 0, can occur
when a displaced worker loses ﬁrm- or sector-speciﬁc human capital. Jovanovic (1979) and
Ljungvist and Sargent (1998) analyze search models with speciﬁc human capital and idiosyn-
cratic shocks to human capital, but they assume risk-neutral workers and do not model the
accumulation of human capital. A decline in health (disability) provides a second example
for a negative human capital shock. In this case, both general and speciﬁc human capital
might be lost. Internal promotions and upward movement in the labor market provide two
examples of positive human capital shocks (ηit > 0).
Remark 2. The budget constraint (2) assumes that the wage is paid in each period. Thus,
if we interpret the η−shock as the skill loss of a displaced worker, we abstract from the
foregone wage during the period of unemployment and focus on the (permanent) diﬀerence
between the wage before job displacement and the wage after job displacement. Empirically,
the permanent component of this wage diﬀerential is quite large (Jacobson, LaLonde, and
7Of course, we restrict the depreciation functions so that the depreciation rate of physical and human
capital never exceeds 100 percent.
7Sullivan 1993, Neal 1995, and Topel 1991).
Remark 3. Investment in human capital is often modeled as time investment. This is
equivalent to formulation (2) if we assume that Y1t = AtF(K1t,H tLt) is the quantity of
goods produced (consumption plus physical capital) and Y2t = AtF(K2t,H t(1 − Lt)) is the
quantity of human capital produced, where Lt denotes the time spent producing the good.
Clearly, this equivalence result is driven by the joint assumption that the two production
functions are identical and exhibit constant-returns-to-scale.
Remark 4. So far, there is no labor-leisure choice. This extension is brieﬂy discussed in
Section V.
Remark 5. Equation (2) does not impose a non-negativity constraint on human capital
investment (xhit ≥ 0). In equilibrium, this non-negativity constraint will not be violated if
positive human capital shocks are not too large. This can immediately be inferred from the
Corollary.
Remark 6. To simplify the analysis, we do not explicitly mention ﬁnancial markets. However,
the equilibrium allocation of the above economy in which households accumulate physical
capital is also the equilibrium allocation of a stock market economy in which the ﬁrm is
a stock company that makes the intertemporal investment decision.8 If we normalize the
number of outstanding shares to one, the stock price is Qt = Kt+1,h o u s e h o l di s equity share
8In general, this type of market arrangement might lead to conceptual problems when markets are incom-
plete because shareholders (households) do not agree on the optimal investment policy (Magill and Quinzii,
1996). This, however, is not the case for the economy analyzed in this paper since here we have agreement
among shareholders in the sense that the equilibrium investment policy maximizes the expected present
discounted value of one-period proﬁts using any household’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution to
discount future proﬁts.
8is θi,t+1Qt = ki,t+1, and the return to equity investment is ˜ rkt − δkt. Moreover, the equilib-
rium allocation is unchanged if households are given the opportunity to trade j =1 ,...,J
securities in zero net supply with payoﬀs Djt = Dj(St). In particular, the introduction of a
risk-free asset in zero net supply (borrowing and lending at the risk-free rate) will not change
the equilibrium allocation.
The budget constraint can be rewritten in a way that shows how the households’s op-
timization problem is basically a standard intertemporal portfolio choice problem. To this
end, deﬁne the following variables: wit
. = kit + hit (total wealth) and ˜ kit
. = kit/hit (the
capital-to-labor ratio). With this new notation, the fraction of total wealth invested in
physical capital is ˜ kit/(1 + ˜ kit) and the fraction of total wealth invested in human capital is
1/(1 + ˜ kit). Introduce further the following (average) rate of returns on the two investment
opportunities: rkt
. =˜ rkt − δkt and rht












wit − cit (3)
wit ≥ 0 , ˜ kit ≥ 0 ,
wi0 given .
Households have identical preferences over consumption plans {cit}. These preferences
allow for a time-additive expected utility representation:
U({cit})=E






Moreover, we assume that the one-period utility function, u,i sg i v e nb yu(c)=c1−γ
1−γ ,γ =1 ,
or u(c)=logc, that is, preferences exhibit constant degree of relative risk aversion γ.
Assumption 4. Preference allow for a time-additive expected utility representation (4)
9with one-period utility function that displays constant relative risk aversion.
II.B. Equilibrium
In general, a sequential equilibrium is a process of prices (returns) and actions deﬁned by
a sequence of functions mapping histories (date-events),(st,St), into current prices and ac-
tions. In this paper, however, we are only interested in sequential equilibria with a recursive
(Markov) structure. Indeed, in this paper we focus attention on recursive equilibria that are
simple in a sense to be deﬁned next.
Introduce the aggregate capital-to-labor ratio ˜ Kt
. = Kt/Ht and the production function
f = f( ˜ K)w i t hf( ˜ K) . = F( ˜ K,1). Using the deﬁnitions rkt
. =˜ rkt − δkt and rht
. =˜ rht − δht,
the ﬁrst-order conditions associated with the ﬁrm’s static maximization problem deﬁne two
functions rk :I R + × S → IR + and rh :I R + × S → IR + as follows
rk( ˜ Kt,S t)=A(St)f
 ( ˜ Kt) − δk(St)( 5 )
rh( ˜ Kt,S t)=A(St)
 
f( ˜ Kt) − ˜ Ktf
 ( ˜ Kt)
 
− δh(St) .
Below we show that there is an equilibrium in which the capital-to-labor ratio is determined
by a function ˜ K : S → IR + assigning to each aggregate state St−1 a capital-to-labor ratio ˜ Kt =
˜ K(St−1). Thus, we have rkt = rk( ˜ K(St−1),S t)a n drht = rh( ˜ K(St−1),S t), and endogenous
returns (prices) in period t therefore depend on (St−1,S t) only. The budget constraint (3) in
conjunction with preferences (4) then imply that in this equilibrium any individually optimal
plan is generated by a policy function g :I R + × s × S2 → IR
3
+ that assigns to each state
(wit,s it,S t−1,S t)a na c t i o n( cit,˜ kit,w i,t+1). Notice that we do not index the policy function,
g,b yi, that is, we conﬁne attention to symmetric recursive equilibria.
Deﬁnition A simple recursive equilibrium is a list of functions ˜ K : S → I R+, rk :
I R+ × S → I R+, rh :I R+ × S → I R+,a n dg :I R+ × s × S2 → I R
3
+ satisfying the following
10conditions.
i) Firms maximize: the functions rk and rh are deﬁned by (5).
ii) Households maximize: the policy function g generates a plan {cit,w it,˜ kit} that maximizes











Remark 7. The above market clearing condition simply states that the physical to human





Kt/Ht. Equilibrium values of physical and human capital are determined by kit = ˜ kitwit/(1+
˜ kit)a n dhit = wit/(1 + ˜ kit), and these markets automatically clear because of the constant-
returns-to-scale assumption. Similarly, summing over the individual budget constraints im-
plies goods market clearing Yt = Ct + Xkt + Xht.
Remark 8. In general, one would expect the portfolio choice of individual households
to depend on their wealth and idiosyncratic shock realization, that is, one would expect
˜ kit = ˜ k(wit,s it,S t−1,S t). In this case, inspection of the market clearing condition immedi-
ately shows that no simple recursive equilibrium exists. However, if it happens to be the
case that ˜ kit = ˜ k(St−1), then the market clearing condition is satisﬁed if ˜ K(St−1)=˜ k(St−1).
III. Existence and Characterization of Equilibrium
Consider an economy in which households live in autarky. That is, consider the decision
problem of a household i who has direct access to the production technology F, but no access










s.t. : cit + xkit + xhit = AtF(kit,h it)
ki,t+1 =( 1 − δkt)kit + xkit ,k it ≥ 0
hi,t+1 =( 1 − δht + ηit)hit + xiht ,h it ≥ 0





1−γ , γ  =1 ,o ru(cit)=logcit. The stochastic productivity and de-
preciation parameters in (6) are again deﬁned by functions At = A(St), δkt = δk(St),
δht = δh(St), and ηit = η(sit,S t). The transition probabilities π(si,t+1,S t+1|sit,S t)=
π(si,t+1,S t+1|St) of the Markov process {sit,S t} are given by the formula π(si,t+1,S t+1|St)=
 
−i π(s1,t+1,...,s I,t+1,S t+1|St). Because of our previous assumption that the transition
probabilities are symmetric with respect to households, these marginal transition probabili-
ties are the same for all households.
Let wit and ˜ kit be deﬁned as before. Because of the constant-returns-to-scale assumption,
the maximization problem (6) can be rewritten as
maxE






s.t. : wi,t+1 =
 
1+r(˜ kit,s it,S t)
 
wit − cit
wit ≥ 0 , ˜ kit ≥ 0 ,
wi0 given ,
where we introduced the total return on investment (in physical and human capital)







rh(˜ kit,S t)+η(sit,S t)
 
. (8)
In (8) the investment return functions rk and rh are deﬁned as in (5).
12It follows from the structure of the decision problem (7) that any plan solving (7) is
generated by a policy function h :I R + × s × S → IR
3
+ assigning to each state (wit,s it,S t)
an action (cit,˜ kit,w i,t+1). Deﬁne the consumption-to-wealth ratio , ˜ cit =
cit
[1+r(˜ kit,sit,St)]wit.W e
have the following result:
Proposition 1. Suppose a solution to the one-agent decision problem (7) exists and has
the property that ˜ kit = ˜ k(St−1), ˜ k : S → I R+,a n d˜ cit =˜ c(St), ˜ c : S → [ ,1 −  ],f o rs o m e
 >0. Then a simple recursive equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium the ﬁrm chooses
˜ K(St−1)=˜ k(St−1) and households choose ˜ kit = ˜ k(St−1) and ˜ c(St). Moreover, if households
have the opportunity to trade short-lived assets j =1 ,...,J in zero net supply with payoﬀs
Djt = Dj(St), then this allocation remains an equilibrium allocation and no trading of the
j =1 ,...,J short-lived assets is an equilibrium outcome.
Proof: See appendix.
Remark 9. The property that the ratio ˜ k is independent of sit and wit, and therefore the
same for all households, is essential for the result that joint production (market economy
of previous section) and autarky production (economy of current section) lead to the same
allocation: if all households in the market economy choose the same ˜ k, then the production
function is basically linear, and the scale of production is irrelevant.
Remark 10. There is a simple intuition for the result that households choose the same
ratio ˜ k in the equilibrium of the market economy. Because of the joint assumption of ho-
mothetic preferences and no exogenous source of income (labor income is generated through
human capital accumulation), the relative share of wealth invested in any asset (physical
and human capital) is independent of the wealth level. Further, these portfolio shares do
not depend on st because idiosyncratic shocks have no predictive power. In short, portfolio
13shares, and therefore the ratio ˜ k, are the same for all households. A similar intuition shows
that the (relative) excess demand for any security j whose payoﬀs do not depend on st+1 is
the same for all households (independent of wit and sit), and the only way to clear markets
is to have zero excess demand for each household. An alternative intuition for the no-trade
result is provided by (12), which shows that idiosyncratic income shocks are permanent in
the sense that individual income (approximately)follows a logarithmic random walk.
Remark 11. Any recursive equilibrium deﬁnes a joint Markov process over endogenous and
exogenous variables with stationary transition function. Given that individual equilibrium
consumption and income follow a logarithmic random walk with state-dependent drift (see
equation 11), there is no stationary distribution of equilibrium consumption and income.
Thus, there is no stationary Markov equilibrium in the sense of Duﬃe et al. (1994). How-
ever, the ratio variables ˜ k (ratio of physical to human capital) and ˜ c (ratio of consumption to
wealth) follow a stationary Markov process if the exogenous shock process {St} is stationary.
This follows immediately from the fact that the equilibrium values of the ratio variables are
functions of S only.
Proposition 1 assumes that a solution to the one-agent decision problem (7) exists. If
γ<1 and capital returns are too high or if γ>1 and capital returns are too low (too










< 1( 9 )
is satisﬁed, then a solution exists (proposition 2 below). Notice that for γ = 1 (log-utility),
(9) reduces to β<1. Condition (9) extends the condition appearing in Jones and Manuelli
(1990) to the case of uncertainty. Jones, Manuelli, and Stacchetti (1999) consider an econ-
omy with uncertainty similar to the one analyzed here. They, however, conﬁne attention to
the linear Markov case with Cobb-Douglas production function and no depreciation shocks,
but allow for random variables with uncountable support. For linear Markov processes with
14Cobb-Douglas production function and no depreciation shocks, condition (9) is the ﬁnite-
state-space analog of the existence condition in Jones, Manuelli, and Stacchetti (1999).
Proposition 2. Suppose condition (9) is satisﬁed. Then there exists a solution to the
maximization problem (7) with ˜ kit = ˜ k(St−1) and ˜ cit =˜ c(St),w h e r e˜ k : S → I R+ and












  1/γ (10)
E

rh(˜ k(S),S )+η(s 
i,S ) − rk(˜ k(S),S )
 







In particular, if γ =1(log-utility), we have ˜ c =1− β.
Proof : See appendix.
Remark 12. The equation system (10) determining the ratio variables ˜ k and ˜ c are the
modiﬁed version of the Euler equations (A1) that are associated with the maximization
problem (7). The ﬁrst equation in (A1) says that the utility cost of investing (saving) one
more unit of the good must be equal to the expected discounted utility gain of doing so,
and the second equation in (A2) states the equality of expected (marginal utility weighted)
returns on the two investment opportunities. The equation system (10) results from (A1)
using the deﬁnition cit =˜ cit(1 + rit)wit and the budget constraint wi,t+1 =( 1+rit)wit − cit.
Combining proposition 1 and 2, we have:
Corollary Suppose condition (9) is satisﬁed. Then there exists a simple recursive equi-
15librium with equilibrium allocation
˜ kit = ˜ k(St−1); ˜ cit =˜ c(St); cit =˜ c(St)
 






wit ; hit = 1
1+˜ k(St−1)wit ; wi,t+1 =[ 1− ˜ c(St)]
 
1+r(˜ k(St−1),s it,S t)
 
wit
and aggregate asset returns
rkt = rk(˜ k(St−1),S t);rht = rh(˜ k(St−1),S t) ,
where ˜ k and ˜ c are the solution to the equation system (10) and r, rk,a n drh are the functions
deﬁned in (5) and (8). Moreover, the above allocation and asset returns are also the equilib-
rium allocation and asset returns for an economy in which households have the opportunity
to trade short-lived securities j =1 ,···,J in zero net supply with payoﬀs Djt = Dj(St).I n
this recursive equilibrium, there is no trade of securities, and security prices are
Qj(St)=E [M(St,S t+1)Dj(St+1)|St] ,











Remark 12. Although the ratio variables ˜ kt and ˜ ct are the same for all households, the
variables kit, hit,a n dcit of course diﬀer across households. That is, idiosyncratic risk matters.
Note also that the equilibrium values of the ratios ˜ kt and ˜ ct are in general diﬀerent from the
values that obtain when markets are complete.
We can gain additional insight into the structure of equilibrium by considering the im-
plications for individual income and consumption. The corollary implies that
yhi,t+1
yhit
= ϕy(St−1,S t,S t+1)
 







1+r(˜ k(St),s i,t+1,S t+1)
 
,
16where yhit =˜ rhthit is labor income of household i in period t. Thus, conditional on the history
of aggregate shocks, the growth rates of labor income and consumption are unpredictable
(recall that si,t+1 is unpredictable). Taking logs and using the approximation log(1+r) ≈ r,
we ﬁnd
logyi,t+1 ≈ ˜ ϕy(St−1,S t,S t+1)+logyit +˜ ηit , (12)
where ˜ ϕyt = logϕyt +
˜ kt
1+˜ ktrkt + 1
1+˜ ktrht and ˜ ηit =
ηit
1+˜ kt. In other words, conditional on
the history of aggregate shocks, individual labor income therefore follows approximately a
logarithmic random walk. In this sense, income shocks are permanent, which provides yet
another intuition for the no-trade result and relates the current production economy to the
exchange economy studied by Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996).
The model has interesting implications for aggregate consumption if aggregate shocks are















Thus, per capita consumption growth rates are i.i.d., that is, it follows (approximately)
a logarithmic random walk and the risk-free rate is constant. Annual data on real short-
term interest rates and consumption show only small deviations from these two properties
(Campbell and Cochrane, 1999).
IV. Extension: Labor-Leisure Choice
Suppose now that output is produced according to Yt = AtF(Kt,H tLt), where At and
F have the same properties as before and Lt is total number of hours households spent
17working.9 Preferences are no given by
U({cit})=E






where u is again a CRRA-utility function and v is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly
increasing, and strictly concave function satisfying the appropriate boundary conditions to
ensure the interiority of the optimal labor choice. Mutatis Mutandis, the a simple recursive
equilibrium is deﬁned as in section II.
Deﬁne again total welath as wit = kit + hit and the ratio variables ˜ kit = kit/hit and
˜ cit = cit/[(1 + rit)wit]. A straightforward extension of the arguments made in the proof of
propositions 1 and 2 shows that there is a simple recursive equilibrium in which households












  1/γ (15)
E

rh(˜ k(S),l(S,S ),S )+η(s 
i,S ) − rk(˜ k(S),l(S,S ),S )
 











rh(˜ k(S),l(S,S ),S )+δh(S )
 





v(1 − l(S,S ))
where rk and rh are the modiﬁed return functions (5).
V. Conclusion
This paper developed a tractable macroeconomic model with incomplete markets and
showed that there are simple recursive equilibria. Because of space limitations, this paper did
9A more realistic assumption might be that
 
i hitlit enters as an argument into the production function.
However, since in equilibrium lit = lt (see below), this assumption leads to the same result.
18not discuss any applications of the framework to macroeconomic policy analysis. However,
the model has already been used to study the growth and welfare eﬀects of social insurance
(Krebs 2001) and the welfare cost of business cycles (Krebs, 2002a).
The current paper does not address the question why certain insurance markets for idio-
syncratic human capital risk are missing. One possible explanation for this lack of insurance
might be the asymmetry of information with respect to idiosyncratic human capital shocks.
An interesting question for future research is to investigate under what conditions the equi-
librium allocation of the incomplete-markets economy is also the constrained eﬃcient alloca-
tion of an economy with asymmetric/private information. The work by Atkeson and Lucas
(1992) suggest that this equivalence does not necessarily hold. However, Cole and Kocher-
lakota (2001) have shown that the incomplete-market equilibria lead to constrained eﬃcient
allocations if information about both individual income and wealth are private. Extending
the analysis of Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) to the current model is an interesting topic for
future research.
19Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of proposition 1 splits into two parts. First, it is shown that the solution to
the one-agent decision problem (7) is also the equilibrium allocation of a one-agent market
economy with supporting prices given by (5) (second welfare theorem for the one-agent
economy). The proof oﬀered here uses Euler equations and transversality condition, but a
dynamic programming approach along the lines of Prescott and Mehra (1980) would also
work.10 Second, it is argued that equilibrium choices and prices for the one-agent market
economy are also the equilibrium choices and prices for the I-agent economy.
Suppose that a solution {wit,˜ kit,c it} to the one-agent decision problem (7) exists. Then


















We next show that the existence of a solution to (7) in conjunction with the condition that





−γ (1 + rit)wit
 
→ 0 . (A2)
holds (the transversality condition is necessary).
Since {wit,˜ kit,c it} is a solution to a maximization problem, expected lifetime utility as-






with at = βtE[(cit)
1−γ /(1−γ)] must converge, which implies that we must have aT → 0. In
10The results in Prescott and Mehra (1980) are not directly applicable because decision variables are
unbounded and the utility function is unbounded from below if γ ≥ 1. Coleman (1991), Greenwood and
Huﬀman (1995), and Morand and Reﬀett (2002) are examples of papers using the Euler equation approach to
non-optimal stochastic growth models. In contrast to Coleman (1991) and Greenwood and Huﬀman (1995),
the work by Morand and Reﬀett (2002) allows for an unbounded state space. However, Morand and Reﬀett









→ 0 . (A3)
Using wit =
cit
(1+rit)˜ cit and   ≤ ˜ cit ≤ 1−  and rmin ≤ rit ≤ rmax for some  >0, rmin > −1, and
rmax < ∞, we ﬁnd that the transversality condition (A2) holds iﬀ (A3) holds. The existence
of rmin and rmax follows from the maintained assumptions on the production process. For
γ = 1 (log-utility), an analogous argument shows that (A2) holds.
We can think of {wit,˜ kit,c it} as the solution to a social planner problem in a one-agent
economy. There is a market problem corresponding to this social planner problem, which
is to maximize (4) subject to the budget constraint (3) with (given) market returns rkt =
rk(˜ kit,S t)a n drht = rh(˜ kit,S t). Equations (A1) and (A2) are also the Euler equations and
transversality condition associated with this market problem (straightforward calculation).
Since Euler equations and transversality condition together are suﬃcient conditions for utility
maximization11 and because {wit,˜ kit,c it} is budget-feasible, this plan is also the solution to
the market problem. Thus, we have shown that if the one-agent decision problem has
a solution, then this solution is also the competitive equilibrium of the one-agent market
economy.
Consider now the I-agent market economy. From the above argument we conclude that
the policy {wit,˜ kit,c it} is also individually optimal in the I-agent market economy when
returns are given by rkt = rk(˜ kit,S t)a n drht = rh(˜ kit,S t). T h u s ,i ts u ﬃ c e st os h o wt h a t
market clearing holds. But with a common capital-to-labor ratio, ˜ kit = ˜ k(St−1), market
clearing automatically holds (for any possible wealth distribution).12
11See, for example, Stokey and Lucas (1989). With our ﬁnite-state-space assumption, their proof of
suﬃciency extends to the uncertainty case in a straightforward way.
12Put diﬀerently, with a common ˜ k, the technology is basically linear, and joint production in one ﬁrm is
equivalent to production in I individual ﬁrms (one ﬁrm per household).
21So far, we have not mentioned recursivity. Suppose that the plan {wit,˜ kit,c it} is generated
by a policy function h :I R + × s × S → IR
3
+ that assigns to each state (wit,s it,S t)a na c t i o n
(cit,˜ kit,w i,t+1) and has the additional property ˜ kit = ˜ k(St−1). Then the corresponding market
equilibrium is clearly a simple recursive equilibrium.
Finally, suppose that households have the opportunity to trade j =1 ,...,J securities in











wit − cit + Dt · θit − Qt · θi,t+1
wit ≥ 0 , ˜ kit ≥ 0 , (A4)
wi0 given ,
where θit =( θit1,...,θ itJ) is the vector of security holdings and Qt =( Qt1,...,Q tJ)i st h e
vector of security prices. To render the individual optimization problem well-deﬁned (to
rule out Ponzi-schemes), let us impose the constraints θijt ≥− B for some B>0. Fix the
equilibrium plan {wit,˜ kit,c it} of the market economy without the j =1 ,...,J securities,
and deﬁne a security price function Qt = Q(St)b y
Qj(St)=E [M(si,t+1,S t,S t+1)Dj(St+1)|St]( A 5 )
M(si,t+1,S t,S t+1)=β
 




The pricing kernel M is simply the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, β (ci,t+1/cit)
−γ.
Clearly, the assumption that ˜ ki,t+1 = ˜ k(St)a n d˜ cit =˜ c(St) is essential for ensuring that the
pricing kernel in period t+1,Mt+1 = M(˜ k(St),s i,t+1,S t+1), does not depend on sit,w h i c hi n
turn ensures that the expression on the right-hand-side of (A5) is the same for all households
i =1 ,...,I. Moreover, the unpredictability of si,t+1 implies that the right-hand-side of (A5)
is unchanged if we include sit or st =( s1t,...,s It) in the information set when calculating
22the conditional expectation. Thus, if household i is given the opportunity to trade the se-
curities at prices (A5), then his Euler equations regarding security trade will be satisﬁed at
θit = 0 (no trade). Since an extended version of the transversality condition still holds, the
choice of {wit,˜ kit,c it} together with θit = 0 is individually optimal. Since by construction all
markets clear, we have found a (recursive) equilibrium for the extended economy in which
households have the opportunity to trade the securities j =1 ,...,J.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2
The proof runs as follows. First, we show that there is a solution to the Euler equations
which has the stated properties. Second, we show that any solution to the Euler equations
also satisﬁes a transversality condition. Since in our case Euler equations and transversality
condition are suﬃcient conditions for an optimum, we have proved that a solution to the
maximization problem (7) with the stated properties exists. Uniqueness of the solution
immediately follows from the strict concavity of the objective function in conjunction with
the convexity of the choice set.13
We will prove the proposition for γ  =1 .F o rγ = 1 (log-utility) the proof follows similar
lines. Using cit =˜ cit(1+rit)wit and wi,t+1 =( 1+rit)wit−cit, we ﬁnd that the Euler equations
(A1) are satisﬁed if the equation system (10) in proposition 2 has a solution 0 < ˜ c(S) ≤ 1
and ˜ k(S) ≥ 0. Denote the number of elements of S by |S|. Since the state space, S,i s
ﬁnite, the functions ˜ c and ˜ k can be identiﬁed with ﬁnite-dimensional vectors ˜ c ∈ IR
|S|
+ and
13There is an alternative way of proving proposition 2. First, extend the argument in Becker and Boyd
(1997) and Jones and Manuelli (1990) to show that a solution to (7) exists, that is, show that the objective
function is semi-continuous and the choice set is compact in the product topology. Since the solution to
(7) is unique (strict concavity of the utility function in conjunction with convexity of the choice set) and
Euler equations are necessary, it then suﬃces to show that a unique solution to the Euler equations exists
(contraction mapping theorem). Jones, Manuelli, and Staccetti (1999) provide a proof along those lines for
economies with Cobb-Douglas production function, linear Markov shocks, and no depreciation shocks.
23˜ k ∈ IR
|S|
+ .L e tx =( ˜ c,˜ k) ∈ IR
2|S|
+ . Finding a solution to the equation system (10) amounts to
ﬁnding a ﬁxed point, x = Tx, for the operator T : X → X, X ⊂ IR
2|S|
+ , deﬁned as follows.
If x  = Tx with x  =( ˜ c ,˜ k ), then ˜ c  is given by the right-hand-side of the ﬁrst set of Euler
equations in (10) and ˜ k  is determined as the solution of the second set of Euler equations.
Notice that for any ˜ c> >0, the solution, ˜ k , to the second set of Euler equations exists and
is unique. This immediately follows from the properties of rh,r k,r that are an implication
of the assumption of a standard neoclasscial production function. To prove the existence
of a solution to (10), we apply Brower’s ﬁxed point theorem. Thus, we need to show the
existence of a non-empty, convex, and compact set X for which T is continuous.
We choose X ≡ ([ ,1])
|S| × ([0,B])
|S| for some 0 < <1a n dB<∞ (below we show
that we can bound ˜ c away from one). Clearly, this set is non-empty, convex, and compact.
Moreover, it is straightforward to show the continuity of T on X. Thus, it is left to show
that the two numbers B and   exist. Notice the importance of bounding ˜ c away from zero,
since T is not even deﬁned if ˜ c(S)=0f o rs o m eS ∈ S.
We begin with the existence of a strictly positive number  . We want to show that if
˜ c ∈ ([ ,1])
|S|,t h e n˜ c = T˜ c ∈ ([ ,1])
|S|.S i n c e T˜ c(S) ≤ 1 obviously holds, we only need to
show that ∀S : T˜ c(S) ≥   if   ≤ ˜ c ≤ 1. Suppose therefore that ˜ c(S) ≥   for all S.I nt h i s











  1/γ ≥  . (A6)
Condition (9) ensures that the term in the brackets is strictly less than one, which implies
that for each S we can ﬁnd a small enough  (S) > 0s ot h a t( A 6 )h o l d s .S i n c et h e r ea r eo n l y
ﬁnitely many states S,w ec a nc h o o s e  . = minS  (S). Notice that in general B = B( ), but
that the number   can be found independently of ˜ k and therefore B.
Finally, we show that the transversality condition (A2) holds. Using ciT =˜ ciT(1+riT)wiT
24and the fact that   ≤ ˜ ciT ≤ 1 −   and rmin ≤ riT ≤ rmax for some  >0, rmin > −1, and








→ 0 . (A7)








< 0 . (A8)
In (A8) we condition the expectation on St only because of the Markov assumption and the
properties of ci,t+1 and ri,t+1. Clearly, if (1 − ˜ cit)1−γ < 1, then condition (9) ensures that
(A8) holds. Since 0 < (1 − ˜ cit) < 1, for γ<1 the inequality (1 − ˜ cit)1−γ < 1 is satisﬁed. It
is left to show that (A8) also holds for the case γ>1.
Let ˜ cmax = maxS˜ c(S). The Euler equations (10) imply
∀S :˜ c(S) ≤
1
1+˜ c−1
max (βE[(1 + ri,t+1)1−γ|S])
1/γ .
Taking the maximum and rearranging terms yields








Inequality (A9) establishes an upper bound on ˜ c that is strictly smaller than one. Using this
inequality, condition (9) in the main text, and γ>1, we ﬁnd
βE
 























This completes the proof of proposition 2.
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